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ABSTRACT
The use of interval forecasts allows climate scientists to issue predictions with high levels of certainty even
for areas fraught with uncertainty, since wide intervals are objectively more likely to capture the truth than
narrow intervals. However, wide intervals are also less informative about what the outcome will be than
narrow intervals, implying a lack of knowledge or subjective uncertainty in the forecaster. In six experiments,
we investigate how laypeople perceive the (un)certainty associated with wide and narrow interval forecasts,
and find that the preference for accuracy (seeing wide intervals as ‘‘objectively’’ certain) versus informa-
tiveness (seeing wide intervals as indicating ‘‘subjective’’ uncertainty) is influenced by contextual cues (e.g.,
question formulation). Most important, we find that people more commonly and intuitively associate wide
intervals with uncertainty thanwith certainty.Our research thus challenges the wisdomof usingwide intervals
to construct statements of high certainty in climate change reports.
1. Introduction
The knowledge of general principles governing the
climate system is sufficient to make strong qualitative
predictions about climate change. For instance, the In-
tergovernmental Panel onClimateChange (IPCC) leaves
little room for doubt when concluding that ‘‘[c]ontinued
emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming
and changes in all components of the climate system’’
(IPCC 2013, p. 19). In contrast, it is not possible to make
precise quantitative predictions of exactly how the
climate will change, even under a given forcing scenario
(such conditional predictions are typically called pro-
jections). Thus, climate scientists generally issue pre-
dictions in the form of interval (range) forecasts (e.g.,
from 0.38 to 1.78C of temperature rise1 or from 0.26
to 0.55m of sea level rise) rather than point forecasts
(e.g., 1.08C of temperature rise). Interval estimates
allow a trade-off between forecast precision and fore-
cast certainty, or what Yaniv and Foster (1995) have
described as a trade-off between informativeness and
accuracy. If a high degree of certainty (accuracy) is
desired, one can forecast a wide interval; for example,
the rate of sea level rise (during the twenty-first cen-
tury) will very likely exceed that observed during 1971
Supplemental information related to this paper is available at
the Journals Online website: https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-18-
0136.s1.
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to 2010 (meaning a rise of more than 20 cm). This is
commonly done in the IPCC reports when summary
statements of high certainty are sought. Alternatively,
if a high level of precision (informativeness) is desired,
one can forecast a narrower interval with a lower de-
gree of certainty (it is likely that sea level will rise be-
tween 26 and 55 cm).
A large body of research shows that people often
misunderstand the verbal probability expressions
(e.g., ‘‘very likely’’ or ‘‘unlikely’’) used by the IPCC (Budescu
et al. 2009; Budescu et al. 2012; Budescu et al. 2014;Harris and
Corner 2011; Harris et al. 2017; Harris et al. 2013; Ho et al.
2015; Juanchich and Sirota 2017), but few studies have ex-
amined how laypeople respond to the use of intervals to
communicate degrees of (un)certainty in the climate
change domain (Dieckmann et al. 2015; Dieckmann
et al. 2017; Joslyn and LeClerc 2016; Løhre and Teigen
2017). We argue and demonstrate in this paper that
the relationship between interval width (i.e., forecast
precision) and certainty is ambiguous: a wide interval
(an imprecise forecast) is ‘‘accurate’’ in the sense that
it has a high probability of capturing the actual outcome,
but its width also signals greater uncertainty about what
the outcome will be, in comparison to a narrow interval
(a more precise and hence more informative forecast).
This ambiguity makes it important for forecasters to
know whether laypeople see wide intervals as more
(or less) certain than narrow ones, andwhich of these two
perspectives on intervals is more frequent and more
intuitively appealing.
The two perspectives on the relationship between
interval width and certainty may rely on two forms
of certainty (Fox and Ülkümen 2011; Hacking 1975;
Kahneman and Tversky 1982). On the one hand,
certainty refers to our state of knowledge or belief.
Such internal or subjective certainty is often ex-
pressed by statements in which the subject is a sentient
being (‘‘I am 90% certain’’) and by using subjective
terms like being confident, or sure (Fox and Ülkümen
2017; Ülkümen et al. 2016). But certainty can also be
used in an external, more objective sense, reflecting
variability, predictability, and randomness in the outside
world. Degrees of certainty are in these contexts often
embedded in statements with an impersonal subject
(‘‘it is 90% certain’’), and are used synonymously with
degrees of probability, likelihood, or chance (Juanchich
et al. 2017; Løhre and Teigen 2016).
With interval predictions, a wider interval allows
for a greater degree of objective certainty (more hits
and fewer misses). Even if the exact number of hits
versus misses can be assessed only retrospectively,
after the outcomes are known, this general relation-
ship can be claimed prospectively on purely logical
grounds. Subjective certainty, however, might not
increase with interval width. In fact, people may see
wide intervals as cueing uncertainty and lack of
knowledge, for two reasons. First, more knowledge
about a topic enables one to be more precise in one’s
statements about it (Yaniv and Foster 1997). Second,
conversational norms suggest that people seek to
maximize informativeness in communication (Grice
1975). The prediction ‘‘The temperature in Oslo will be
between 2358 and 1358C tomorrow’’ is true, with close
to 100% certainty, but is also far too vague to be useful
for someone preparing for a visit. A forecaster with
higher subjective confidence may make a more precise,
informative prediction (‘‘The temperature at noon will
be between 158 and 188C’’), which can be seen as conveying
more certain expectations about tomorrow’s weather.
Thus, different concepts of certainty might lead to
different views on the implications of wide versus
narrow interval predictions. Those who find a wide
interval to be more certain, by being more likely to
include the true (actual) values, will in this paper be
referred to as showing a preference for accuracy. In
contrast, those who consider a wide interval to be less
certain, by being less informative and expressing lower
confidence about expected outcomes, display a pref-
erence for informativeness.
Previous research has found support for both types of
preference (or ‘‘mindsets’’). In line with the informa-
tiveness mindset, laypeople expect experts to give nar-
rower interval estimates than novices (McKenzie et al.
2008). Recipients of information prefer precise state-
ments (Du et al. 2011; Jørgensen 2016), with narrow
intervals occasionally preferred over wide intervals even
when the wide interval includes the correct answer while
the narrow interval does not (McKenzie andAmin 2002;
Yaniv and Foster 1995). Teigen (1990) found that peo-
ple placedmore confidence in precise statements than in
vague statements, but also that people chose the more
precise statement when asked which statement they
would be more skeptical about. Participants in a recent
study received high and low probability forecasts made
by climate change experts, and completed the forecasts
by filling in corresponding intervals (Løhre and Teigen
2017). Some associated high probabilities with wide in-
tervals, but many did the opposite and assigned narrow
intervals to high probabilities. Similar results were ob-
tained when people were givenwide and narrow interval
forecasts, and asked to fill in missing probability values.
Some participants assumed wide intervals were more
probable, whereas others felt they were less probable
than narrow intervals.
These studies leave open several important ques-
tions that we address in the present paper. 1) Is one
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‘‘mindset’’ more prevalent than the other? 2) Can con-
textual and linguistic cues, which are known to change
the way people think about probabilities (Løhre and
Teigen 2016; Nisbett et al. 1983; Reeves and Lockhart
1993;Ülkümen et al. 2016), also influence people’s views
on the relationship between interval width and cer-
tainty? These two questions were investigated in ex-
periments 1–5, in which we manipulated the focus of a
question about certainty. We predicted that a question
about which of two intervals is ‘‘more certain to be
correct’’ would promote reflections about objective
certainty, accuracy, and the probability of hits and mis-
ses and should accordingly be answered in favor of the
wide interval. On the other hand, a question about which
interval ‘‘conveys more certainty’’ would make thoughts
about informational value and subjective certainty more
salient and would induce people to find wide intervals to
imply less certainty than narrow ones. 3) A third issue is
which mindset people find more intuitive. Experiment
6 investigated laypeople’s theories about interval width
and probability and asked people to rate how intui-
tively appealing two statements compatible with the two
mindsets were.
2. Experiments 1–5: Effects of question type on the
perception of wide versus narrow intervals
a. Participants
The participants in these experiments (total N 5 923;
see Table 1) were university students from the United
Kingdom and Norway, who volunteered to participate
or who received course credits for participation, and
Amazon Mechanical Turk, Inc. (MTurk), workers from
the United States, who were paid to complete the
questionnaires. Both of these types of convenience
samples are typical in psychology experiments and
are often reasonably similar to community samples
(Goodman et al. 2013; Paolacci et al. 2010). For the
purpose of the current studies, namely to investigate
subjective perceptions of interval forecasts of climate
change, we would expect that participants from these
samples should be at least as well equipped (if not
better) to interpret the information as more represen-
tative samples would be.
b. Materials and procedure
In all experiments, the participants received interval
forecasts of sea level rise and temperature rise by the
end of the century from two different teams of climate
scientists. One team issued a forecast with a wide in-
terval (e.g., ‘‘The temperature will increase between
1.18 Celsius and 6.48 Celsius’’), while the other team
gave a forecast with a narrower interval (e.g., ‘‘The
temperature will increase between 2.28 Celsius and
5.48Celsius’’). The participants were asked, in three to
four different conditions in the different experi-
ments, to choose which prediction ‘‘conveys more
uncertainty [certainty]’’ or which prediction ‘‘is more
likely [certain, uncertain] to be correct’’. These ques-
tions were formulated to focus on informativeness or
on accuracy, respectively. An overview of the ques-
tions used in the different experiments is provided in
Table 2, and more detailed descriptions of the proce-
dure for each experiment are provided below. The full
description of the scenarios, as well as separate sta-
tistical analysis of each experiment, can be found in the
online supplemental materials (in section 2c only the
overall results are described). Several of the experi-
ments also investigated secondary hypotheses, which
are briefly described below, and more detailed de-
scriptions and analyses are provided in the supple-
mental material.
1) MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE VARIATIONS IN
EXPERIMENTS 1–5
In experiment 1, we manipulated question type and
reasons for variability in a 2 3 2 within-subject design.
Participants completed a daily survey for 14 days. On
the third day the participants received questions about
which interval ‘‘is most likely to be correct,’’ and on
day 6 they received questions about which interval
‘‘conveys most uncertainty.’’ The same questions were
repeated on days 9 and 11, but here participants also
received an explanation for the variability in the expert
forecasts. The variability was explained by referring to
TABLE 1. Demographics for the samples used in the different experiments.
Expt no. n Sample Mean age (SD) Female Male
1 81 University of Essex students 24.0 (6.5) 80.2% 19.8%
2 201 Amazon Mechanical Turk 37.9 (12.0) 51.7% 48.3%
3 238 Amazon Mechanical Turk 37.7 (11.2) 47.9% 52.1%
4 302 Amazon Mechanical Turk 34.6 (10.4) 44.4% 55.6%
5 101 University of Essex, snowball sampling 28.0 (13.1) 36.6% 62.4%
6 105 University of Oslo students 23.1 (4.9) 76.2% 23.8%
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temperature rise ‘‘in different countries’’ and sea level
rise ‘‘in different parts of the world’’. On day 14 par-
ticipants rated their belief in climate change by an-
swering four questions taken from Heath and Gifford
(2006). For each scenario (temperature and sea level
rise), participants could choose one of the two predic-
tions or rate them as equal.
Participants in experiment 2 received the same
questions as in experiment 1, but this was a 23 2 design
with question type and reason for variability varied
between subjects. Hence, participants in different
groups received questions either about which interval
‘‘conveys most uncertainty’’ or which interval ‘‘is most
likely to be correct’’ and either received an explanation
for the variability in estimates or did not receive such an
explanation.
In experiment 3, we attempted to control for some
potential confounding factors in experiments 1 and 2.
Beside their focus on informativeness or accuracy, the
questions used in the first two experiments differed
in several respects. First, the term ‘‘uncertainty’’ was
used in the informativeness-focus condition and the
term ‘‘likely’’ was used in the accuracy-focus condi-
tion. These terms were assumed to be associated with
different sources of uncertainty, with ‘‘uncertainty’’
being an internal/epistemic term and ‘‘likely’’ an
external/aleatory term (Ülkümen et al. 2016). Second,
the two terms differ in their directionality (Teigen and
Brun 1995, 1999). While the word uncertain has a neg-
ative directionality (i.e., it points toward the possibility
that an outcome might not occur), the word likely has a
positive directionality (i.e., it points toward the possi-
bility that an outcome might occur). To better control
for the source of uncertainty and directionality of the
verbal probabilities used in the question, we used the
two terms ‘‘uncertain(ty)’’ and ‘‘certain(ty)’’, which are
usually considered as reflecting epistemic uncertainty
(Fox and Ülkümen 2011; Teigen and Løhre 2017;
Ülkümen et al. 2016). The word stem was hence kept
constant while directionality and question type varied
between subjects, with different groups of partici-
pants receiving the question about which prediction
‘‘conveys more [un]certainty’’ and which prediction is
‘‘more [un]certain to be correct.’’
In experiment 4, we removed the (arguably incorrect)
‘‘equal’’ option, so the participants chose between the
wide and the narrow interval in each condition. Partic-
ipants read the same temperature rise and sea level rise
vignettes as in previous experiments in one of three
conditions: uncertainty conveyed, certainty conveyed,
and certain to be correct.
In experiment 5, we added a third prediction that
featured a narrower interval to each vignette, for two
reasons: first, to highlight even more strongly that the
teams differ in width of prediction intervals; and second,
since the intervals in previous experiments were both
very wide, to include a very narrow interval that suggests
high precision but might be ‘‘too good to be true.’’
Participants read the sea level and temperature rise
scenarios and for each selected one of the three forecasts
as the one that conveyedmore certainty, conveyedmore
uncertainty, or was more certain to be correct, in three
between-subjects conditions.
2) SECONDARY HYPOTHESES
In addition to investigating the prevalence of the in-
formativeness and accuracy mindsets and their associa-
tions with different kinds of questions, experiments






interval conveys. . .’’
Question(s)/statements
focused on accuracy:
‘‘Which interval is. . .’’ Response options Design
1 ‘‘. . .most uncertainty?’’ ‘‘. . .most likely to be correct’’ Wide, narrow, or equal Within subjects
2 ‘‘. . .most uncertainty?’’ ‘‘. . .most likely to be correct’’ Wide, narrow, or equal Between subjects
3 ‘‘. . .more uncertainty?’’; ‘‘. . .more
certainty?’’
‘‘. . .more certain to be correct?’’;
‘‘. . .more uncertain to be
correct?’’
Wide, narrow, or equal Between subjects
4 ‘‘. . .more uncertainty?’’ ‘‘. . .more
certainty?’’
‘‘. . .more certain to be correct?’’ Wide or narrow Between subjects
5 ‘‘. . .more uncertainty?’’; ‘‘. . .more
certainty?’’
‘‘. . .more certain to be correct?’’ Wide, medium, or narrow Between subjects
6 ‘‘Wide intervals indicate that it is more
uncertain what the outcome will
be’’; ‘‘Narrow intervals indicate that
it is more certain what the outcome
will be’’
‘‘It is more certain that projections
using wide intervals will be
correct’’; ‘‘It is more uncertain
that projections using narrow
intervals will be correct’’
Ratings of the intuitive
appeal of both statements
Within subjects
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1–5 also addressed some additional hypotheses. In ex-
periments 1 and 2, we investigated whether the accuracy
mindset would be seen as more appropriate (i.e., wide
intervals associated with certainty) in contexts where
interval width could be related to variability. Predictions
concerning a class of multiple outcomes might induce
more distributional (‘‘outside view’’) thinking, with
wide intervals reflecting external variability, in contrast
to predictions of a singular outcome, where wide inter-
vals are more easily taken to reflect the forecaster’s ig-
norance (Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and
Lovallo 1993; Nisbett et al. 1983; Reeves and Lockhart
1993). Hence, participants in different conditions in
experiments 1 (within subjects) and 2 (between subjects)
were told that the intervals described temperature rise
‘‘in different countries’’ and sea level rise ‘‘in different
parts of the world,’’ whereas no explanation for the
variability in the estimate was given in the other
conditions.
In experiment 3, we investigated whether perceptions
of expertise could be influenced by question type, with
the hypothesis that questions highlighting informative-
ness would lead to a stronger preference for experts
giving narrow interval forecasts, as compared to ques-
tions highlighting accuracy. Therefore, after selecting
the prediction that conveys more (un)certainty/is more
(un)certain to be correct, participants in experiment
3 rated which team seemed more trustworthy, seemed
to have most knowledge (about temperature rise or
sea level rise), seemed to have the best models (for
predicting temperature rise or sea level rise), and
seemed to be most competent. These ratings were
done on scales from 1 (definitely the team with the
wide interval) to 5 (definitely the team with the nar-
row interval).
Experiment 4 investigated factors that might explain
people’s preference for narrow intervals: their fluency
and the perceived expertise of the speaker. Previous
research has found that statements that are more
fluent (i.e., easier to process), for example due to
repetition or to heightened visibility, are judged as
more truthful than less fluent statements (Arkes et al.
1989; Reber and Schwarz 1999). We expected that
predictions with narrower intervals might be easier to
process than predictions with wider intervals, and
that this heightened fluency could be a reason why
people prefer narrow intervals. Narrow intervals
might also be preferred due to the association be-
tween precision and expertise. Hence, participants in
experiment 4 rated the fluency of the predictions
featuring a narrow and a wide interval, as well as the
perceived expertise of the teams (see the online
supplemental material for more details about the
rating scales).
For exploratory purposes, we included in experiment
5 three measures of individual differences that might be
related to the degree of perception of wide intervals
as more uncertain and narrow intervals as more cer-
tain. Specifically, strong climate change beliefs could
explain a preference for wide intervals as certain, since
wide intervals can incorporate more extreme climate
change values. In addition, people who are more nu-
merate, and people who are able to understand the
probability of occurrence of more than one event (i.e.,
people who correctly assess that the probability of one
of two events is greater than the probability of occur-
rence of each of those events), might be better able
to appraise that a wider interval means a greater likeli-
hood to be correct. Hence, we included a climate change
belief scale (Heath and Gifford 2006), a numeracy scale
FIG. 1. Choices of which interval conveys more certainty and uncertainty.
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(Lipkus et al. 2001), and a disjunction task [adapted
from Costello (2009)].
c. Results
1) EFFECTS OF QUESTION FOCUS
Participants in experiments 1–5 received wide and
narrow interval forecasts of sea level rise and temper-
ature rise from two different (fictional) teams of cli-
mate scientists, and indicated which interval conveyed
more (un)certainty (question focused on informative-
ness) or was more likely [(un)certain] to be correct
(question focused on accuracy).
Question focus strongly influenced certainty judg-
ments (Figs. 1 and 2). Participants largely chose the
wide interval as the one that conveyedmore uncertainty,
and indicated that the narrow interval conveyed more
certainty. Responses to questions about which interval
was more likely or more certain to be correct were
mixed: some experiments showed a small preference for
the wide interval, while narrow and wide intervals were
seen as equally certain in other experiments.
Figure 3 summarizes the overall results (for all ex-
periments with three response options, i.e., all experi-
ments except experiment 4), with responses coded
according to whether wide intervals are seen as more
certain (consistent with the accuracy mindset), narrow
intervals are seen as more certain (consistent with the
informativeness mindset), or both intervals are seen as
equally likely. Analysis of experiments 2, 3, and 5, in
which question focus was varied between subjects and
three response alternatives (wide more certain, narrow
more certain, or equal/‘‘medium’’ interval more cer-
tain) were provided, showed a clear effect of question
FIG. 2. Choices of which interval is more certain/likely and more uncertain to be correct.
FIG. 3. Overall preference for wide vs narrow intervals as ‘‘more certain’’ for all experiments
with three response options (experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5).
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focus: x2 (2;N5 1080)5 213.373, with p, 0.001.While
wide intervals were clearly associated with uncertainty
after informativeness-focused questions, more partici-
pants associated wide intervals with certainty after
accuracy-focused questions. However, even for ques-
tions about correctness, where wide intervals should
logically be chosen as more certain, only about 40% of
the participants did so.
2) RESULTS FOR SECONDARY HYPOTHESES
In experiments 1 and 2, we investigated whether giving
people an explanation for variability, for instance by
telling them that the forecasts concerned sea level rise ‘‘in
different parts of theworld,’’ would facilitate the accuracy
mindset (i.e., would make more people associate wide
intervals with certainty). However, this hint about vari-
ability did not affect participants’ interval choice in either
experiment 1 (p 5 0.150) or experiment 2 (p 5 0.303).
We further examined whether the accuracy and
informativeness mindsets led to different inferences about
the forecaster. Participants in experiment 3 rated whether
they found teams giving wide or narrow interval forecasts to
have more expertise, on scales from 1 (definitely the team
with the wide interval) to 5 (definitely the team with the
narrow interval). The average of the ratings of the experts
across scenarios (i.e., an average of the four questions per
scenario) was slightly higher in the ‘‘conveys more’’ con-
ditions [M5 3.50; standard deviation (SD)5 0.73] than in
the ‘‘to be correct’’ conditions (M5 3.29; SD5 0.87), and
this differencewas significant [F(1, 234)5 3.991; p5 0.047;
h2p 5 0.017]. In otherwords, the teamwith narrow intervals
was rated more positively after informativeness-focused
questions, indicating that making one or the other mindset
salient can influence how well both the prediction and the
communicator are received.
Experiment 4 investigated whether people find nar-
row intervals easier to process (i.e., more fluent) and
more related to expertise than wide intervals. As pre-
dicted, participants judged the narrow interval as being
easier to process and as reflecting more expertise than
the wide interval (see the online supplemental material
for more details about these findings).
In experiment 5 we set out to investigate individual
differences that might be related to the preference
for informativeness versus accuracy. Specifically, we
asked participants about their climate change beliefs
and gave them a test measuring numeracy and a test
measuring their understanding of disjunctive proba-
bilities. However, there were no clear correlation
patterns between interval choice and any of these
three measures across groups, and the experiment did
not have enough power to detect differences within
each condition.
3. Experiment 6: Is it more intuitive to associate
wide intervals with uncertainty than with
certainty?
Experiments 1–5 demonstrated that different ques-
tion focus promotes different views about the relation-
ship between certainty and interval width. However, the
fact that only about 40% endorsed wide intervals as
‘‘more certain to be correct’’ indicates that it is more
common to associate wide intervals with (subjective)
uncertainty than with (objective) certainty. This raises
the possibility that the layperson’s view about the re-
lationship between interval width and certainty is more
in line with the informativeness mindset than with the
accuracy mindset.
In support of this idea, research on confidence in-
tervals has repeatedly shown that people produce
intervals that are too narrow for the assigned degree
of certainty (Moore et al. 2016). This consistent
overprecision (Moore and Healy 2008) is very hard to
eliminate and suggests that the preference for informa-
tiveness may be a dominant intuitive response. Studies
showing that recipients of information in general pre-
fer narrow intervals illustrate a similar point (Du et al.
2011; Jørgensen 2016; McKenzie andAmin 2002; Yaniv
and Foster 1995), as does the preliminary finding that
people with higher numeracy can (sometimes) better
appreciate the trade-off between precision and cer-
tainty than those with lower numeracy (Løhre and
Teigen 2017). Hence, we ran experiment 6 to test the
hypothesis of an intuitive preference for informative-
ness among laypeople.
a. Materials and procedure
The opening paragraph of the survey in experiment
6 explained that climate scientists sometimes use intervals
when giving their predictions of future outcomes, and
presented two predictions concerning the expected sea
level rise in the Oslo fjord. One of the predictions
contained a wide interval (a minimum of 20 cm of sea
level rise and a maximum of 60 cm), and the other
prediction contained a narrow interval (a minimum of
30 cm of sea level rise and a maximum of 50). Partici-
pants (students at the University of Oslo, N5 105; see
Table 1) were randomly assigned to either the wide
condition, for which it was pointed out that one pre-
diction is wider than the other, or to the narrow con-
dition, for which it was pointed out that one prediction
is narrower than the other.
The text then explained that there are two different
ways that one can think about the relationship between
interval width and uncertainty, using the following
formulation in the wide condition:
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d ‘‘On the one hand, WIDE intervals indicate that it is
MORE UNCERTAIN what the outcome will be
(the sea level could rise by anything from 20 to
60 cm, compared to 30 to 50 cm for the narrow
interval).
d On the other hand, it is MORE CERTAIN that
projections using WIDE intervals will be correct (the
forecast is correct if the sea level rises by anything
from 20 to 60 cm, compared to 30 to 50 cm for the
narrow interval).’’
In other words, the accuracy mindset (seeing the wide
interval as more certain to be correct) and the infor-
mativeness mindset (seeing the wide interval as indi-
cating that it is more uncertain what the outcome will
be) were explained to the participants. In the narrow
condition, the text explained that narrow intervals
could be seen as indicating that it is more certain what
the outcome will be, or that it is more uncertain that
predictions using narrow intervals will be correct. The
order of the statements was counterbalanced in both
conditions.
After reading the description of the different ways of
thinking about intervals and uncertainty, participants
were asked to rate how intuitive, natural, appealing,
logical, and complicated they found the two ways of
thinking, on scales from 1 (not intuitive/natural etc.
at all) to 7 (very intuitive/natural etc.). Next, the par-
ticipants were given tests of numeracy (Cokely et al.
2012; Schwartz et al. 1997) and cognitive reflection
(Frederick 2005) to see whether individual differences
in these abilities were related to a preference for infor-
mativeness or accuracy. Last, participants were asked
if they had already seen or responded to the cognitive
reflection test online or in other experiments.
b. Results
Figures 4 and 5 display the ratings of the different
mindsets for both wide and narrow intervals, and show
that the view that wide intervals convey uncertainty
was judged as more intuitive, natural, appealing, logi-
cal, and less complicated than the view that wide in-
tervals are more certain to be correct. For simplicity we
refer to this combination of attributes as more ‘‘in-
tuitively appealing.’’ We also computed an average
difference score to measure the degree to which one
‘‘mindset’’ was judged as more intuitively appealing
than the other, by taking the ‘‘wide 5 uncertain’’ and
‘‘narrow 5 certain’’ ratings, which are in line with the
informativeness mindset, and subtracting the corre-
sponding ‘‘wide 5 certain’’ and ‘‘narrow 5 uncertain’’
ratings, which are in line with the accuracy mindset.2
Thus, positive difference scores indicate that the in-
formativeness mindset is seen as more intuitively ap-
pealing than the accuracy mindset. The average
difference score for the five items (Cronbach’s a 5
0.74) did not differ between conditions [F(1, 103) 5
0.144; p 5 0.706; h2p 5 0.001]. More interesting, the
average difference score across conditions was positive
(M 5 0.42; SD 5 1.32) and differed significantly from
0 [t(104) 5 3.290; p 5 0.001; 95% confidence interval:
(0.17, 0.68)]. Hence, participants overall judged the
informativeness mindset as more intuitively appealing
than the accuracy mindset.
FIG. 4. Mean perceptions of two ways of thinking about wide intervals (wide is certain vs wide
is uncertain) in experiment 6; error bars indicate 61 standard error of the mean (SEM).
2 The only exception was for the ratings of how complicated the
participants found the two ways of thinking to be. Here the
‘‘wide 5 uncertain’’ ratings were subtracted from the ‘‘wide 5
certain’’ ratings, and the ‘‘narrow 5 certain’’ ratings were sub-
tracted from the ‘‘narrow 5 uncertain’’ ratings.
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There was no significant correlation with the average
difference score for either the cognitive reflection test
(correlation coefficient r 5 0.01; p 5 0.958) or numeracy
(r 5 0.09; p 5 0.355). However, people with higher cog-
nitive reflection and numeracy perceived both mindsets
as more intuitive, as shown by positive correlations be-
tween the cognitive reflection test and the informative-
ness (r5 0.20; p5 0.040) and accuracymindsets (r5 0.21;
p 5 0.037), and between numeracy and the informa-
tiveness (r5 0.24; p5 0.014) and accuracymindsets (r5
0.14; p5 0.161). Hence, higher scores on these measures
indicate a tendency to find it intuitive to use intervals
to express both certainty and uncertainty.
4. General discussion
The experiments reported in this paper fill a gap in the
literature about climate change communication (Moser
2010; Pidgeon and Fischhoff 2011) by investigating lay-
person perceptions of the relationship between interval
width (forecast precision) and certainty. We found evi-
dence of two alternative ways of thinking. Overall, in-
dependent of question focus, 45% of our participants3
perceived narrow intervals as giving more certain
knowledge about what the outcome will be, in line with
what we have called a preference for informativeness,
while 26% of the participants perceived that wide
intervals have a higher certainty of capturing the true
value, displaying a preference for accuracy. These two
opposite ‘‘mindsets’’ can be made more or less salient
by drawing attention to different types of uncer-
tainty. Questions about which interval conveys more
(un)certainty (i.e., focusing more on subjective uncer-
tainty) led to a consistent preference for informative-
ness, while questions about which interval is more
certain/likely to be correct (i.e., focusing more on ob-
jective certainty) led to a response pattern more in line
with the accuracy mindset.
Questions focused on informativeness led to a clearer
response pattern (wide intervals seen as uncertain and
narrow ones as certain) than did questions focused on
accuracy. It is somewhat puzzling that people were so
divided in their answers to the question about which
interval is more likely/certain to be correct. Logically,
wider intervals are objectively more likely to capture the
outcome value that will occur, as they cover both central
(likely) and more peripheral (unlikely) values. Our re-
sults indicate that (perhaps for good reasons) people
would like to know more precisely what the expected
values are, and hence find it more intuitive to adopt the
informativeness than the accuracy mindset, as shown
in experiment 6. Although the generalizability of the
results should be investigated in nonwestern samples, we
find it noteworthy that they are replicated in two dif-
ferent languages (Norwegian vs English), in three dif-
ferent countries (Norway, United Kingdom, and the
United States), and with both student and MTurk sam-
ples. Note also that our participants should be more
educated and arguablymore knowledgeable about these
topics than more representative samples. Hence, one
might expect an even stronger preference for informa-
tiveness in a more representative sample.
These results have important theoretical implications,
particularly for the literature on overprecision (Moore
et al. 2016). The intuitive preference for informativeness
FIG. 5. Mean perceptions of two ways of thinking about narrow intervals (narrow is uncertain
vs narrow is certain) in experiment 6; error bars indicate 61 SEM.
3 These percentages are based on all experiments with three
response alternatives (widemore certain, narrowmore certain, and
equal), i.e., experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5.
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means that wide intervals are usually associated with
uncertainty, and as a result, people may not understand
or agree that they should widen their intervals to in-
crease their certainty. This can be said to strengthen
the conversational norms/informativeness account of
overprecision (Kaesler et al. 2016; Yaniv and Foster
1995, 1997).
Climate scientists may choose to give wide intervals
to present predictions with high certainty. Yet, our
results show that wide intervals are a stronger signal of
(subjective) uncertainty than of (objective) certainty,
and the use of wide intervals may therefore undermine
trust in climate scientists and their predictions. Al-
though language that accentuates the accuracy mindset
may make wide intervals more acceptable to the public
(see experiment 3), our results suggest that many re-
cipients will still prefer narrow intervals, as suggested
by 25% of the participants given accuracy-focused
questions in our experiments (see Fig. 3). Note, how-
ever, that in the current experiments the participants
only received intervals, and were asked about their
perceptions of (un)certainty. In statements from the
IPCC, intervals are often accompanied by verbal or
numerical probability statements (e.g., ‘‘During the
last interglacial period, the Greenland ice sheet very
likely contributed between 1.4 and 4.3m to higher
global mean sea level’’) (IPCC 2013). A recent study
showed that explicitly mentioning the high certainty of
wide intervals can counteract the tendency of laypeo-
ple to see such intervals as uncertain, with most people
stating that a wide interval with 90% probability was
more certain than a narrow interval with 50% proba-
bility (Teigen et al. 2018).
Nevertheless, the current evidence gives reason to be
skeptical about the use of wide intervals to achieve high
certainty in statements about climate change. How-
ever, presenting a precise interval along with a state-
ment about the low certainty of such an interval is
arguably not a much better option. One compromise
solution would be to provide two intervals rather than
one: a narrow (informative) interval paired with a wide
(confident) interval, to satisfy both camps of readers.
The drawback is that presenting two intervals simul-
taneously adds complexity to the communication of an
already complex topic. Using graphical representations
could be useful to simultaneously communicate in-
formativeness and accuracy in a relatively simple way
(Spiegelhalter et al. 2011). In any case, communicators
should be aware that the current practice of claiming to
be very certain about a very wide interval will to many
readers sound like a contradiction in terms, which
might damage rather than strengthen the public’s belief
in climate science.
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